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COMMENTS
The word "option" is often used for any continuing offer regardless of
whether it is revocable for lack of consideration; but more commonly the word
is used to denote an offer that is irrevocable and therefore a contract.3 5
To make unqualified statements, such as were made in several of the
above cases, that an, "option contract is unilateral," can be deceiving.
Corbin, for instance, says:
An option contract can be either unilateral or bilateral .... If A pays B $100
cash in return for B's promise to convey Blackacre to A for $5,000 if paid within
30 days, they have made a unilateral option contract. A has an irrevocable option
to buy, good for 30 days; he has made no promise of any kind, being equally
privileged to buy or not to buy-his option or freedom of choice is wholly un-
limited. Nevertheless, B's promise is binding because he has been paid $100 for it.
On the other hand, suppose that instead of paying cash A had given to B his
promissory note for $100, or his oral promise to pay that sum, in return for B's
promise to convey Blackacre to A for $5,000, if paid within 30 days. The con-
tract thus made is bilateral, each party having made a binding promise.3 6
According to Corbin's analysis, an option contract may be bilateral as well
as unilateral and the unqualified statement that an option contract is uni-
lateral is incorrect. Since neither Williston or the Restatement use the
words "unilateral contract," and because its use tends to be confusing, and
since no purpose is served in calling an option a "unilateral contract," it
would be helpful if the words were omitted completely.
CONCLUSION
Professor Page apparently did not think that the term "unilateral con-
tract" was the best that could be used to describe "an offer for an act."
Perhaps it is not, but as it now stands, the term is in existence and appears
likely to remain firmly entrenched in the legal vocabulary. The problem
lies in the fact that the words "unilateral contract" have been tossed
about carelessly and confusion has been the result.
The Illinois courts have varied in their repeated use of the terms. If
"unilateral" and "unilateral contract" were used uniformly, or better yet,
used as defined by Williston, Corbin, and the Restatement, much of the
confusion revolving around the law of unilateral contracts would be
cleared up.
35 § 24 Comment c. 30 1 Corbin, Contracts § 260 (1950).
BASES FOR AWARDING COMPENSATION TO TRUSTEES
Historically, the law as expressed in the early English cases and in some
of the American jurisdictions was that a trustee was not entitled to com-
pensation for his services and time in administering a trust. The trustee's
efforts were merely gratuitous without regard to any advantage that
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might result from his skill and diligence.' A court adopting this principle
felt that to pay trustees:
[W]ould have the tendency to tempt the trustee to disregard the interest of
the beneficiaries, and lead, in general, to the consequence of loading the estate
for the benefit of the trustee, by pretenses of care, trouble, and loss of time; thus
placing the trustee in a position, which equity forbids, where his personal inter-
ests would conflict with the performance of his duty.2
Presently, although this non compensatory theory is still prevalent in
England, the law in this country is well established that a trustee shall be
reasonably compensated for his services in caring for a trust.3 This rule is
applied whether the trust be administered by an individual or a corpora-
tion; whether the trust be inter vivos or testamentary, private or chari-
table. 4 The courts' reasoning in repudiating the earlier law is based ol the
concept that any "laborer is worthy of his hire," and since compensation
is generally provided for administrators, executors, and guardians, then
trustees should also be awarded compensation.5
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of this law of compensation, a
myriad of controversies and complexities has arisen in an attempt by
various jurisdictions to arrive at some reasonable basis in awarding fees to
trustees. The aim of the ensuing comment is not to embrace the many
ramifications with which this topic is laden, but rather to apprise the
reader of the several considerations which the courts entertain in establish-
ing criteria on which to predicate the amount of compensation.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
One of the most important considerations in establishing the trustee's
fee is the provisions in trust instruments wherein the settlor and trustee
agree as to the amount of ompensation.6 The provision either awards a
particular amount or percentage of the estate or, not infrequently, the
terms of the trust instrument provide merely that the trustee shall be
"reasonably" compensated for his efforts. In the latter cases, the courts
generally allow compensation after determining what would be a just and
proper fee considering the time, attention, and labor devoted to the affairs
'Cook v. Gilmore, 133 I1. 139, 24 N.E. 524 (1890); Huggins v. Rider, 77 111. 360
(1875); Gilbert v. Sutliff, 3 Ohio St. 129 (1853); Boyd v. Hawkins, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.)
160 (1832); Miles v. Bacon, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 457 (1830).
2 Cook v. Gilmore, 133 I11. 139, 143, 24 N.E. 524, 525 (1890).
34 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, 5 974 (1948) containing a complete list of cases.
4 Hart v. Taylor, 301 111. 344, 133 N.E. 857 (1921); In re Rothenberg, 136 N.J. 530,
42 A. 2d 767 (1945); In Matter of Hayden, 175 Misc. 506, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 15 (1940).
5 Schriver v. Frommel, 183 Ky. 597, 210 S.W. 165 (1919).
6 James v. Echols, 183 Ark. 826, 39 S.W. 2d 290 (1931); Croker v. Palm Beach Estates,
94 Fla. 171, 114 So. 225 (1927).
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of the estate.7 Where, however, a fixed amount or percentage is provided
for, the courts encounter some difficulty in an endeavor to modify the
amount agreed upon, such modification being necessary because of fortui-
tous circumstances which arise. For instance, upon the occurrence of
facts which make the trustee's performance more cumbersome than it was
at the time of the agreement, courts often award a greater amount than
that agreed upon." In justifying such an increase in fee, the court in Smith
v. Stover reasoned:
[T]he courts cannot put themselves in the place of the testator, and have no
right to change the compensation fixed by the testator, except in case of an
exigency, or an emergency. Such exigency or emergency must be of such a
nature and character which threatens a proper administration of the trust, or en-
dangers a full and complete carrying out of the testator's intention. If such an
exigency or emergency is shown to exist, then the law is otherwise, and the court
has authority to see that the will of the testator is properly carried outY
The trustee, however, is entitled to this increment only if he has pro-
cured the agreement with the settlor without abuse of his fiduciary and
confidential relationship. 10 Thus, in Lederman v. Lisinsky" where a law-
yer acting as trustee failed to make full disclosure and explanations re-
garding the trust, and because he had gained a personal advantage by such
failure, the court compelled him to forego such advantage enabling the
settlor to strike the alleged provision -relating to the amount of compen-
sation.
In some instances, the trust agreement provides that the trustee is to
receive some particular benefit as a recompense for his services. 12 As a
result, the query is posed as to whether the trustee is to receive such bene-
fit in addition to, or in place of the benefit. Generally, in such cases, the
benefit is inferred to be a gift in addition to the regular compensation un-
less there is evidence showing the contrary. 13 A few jurisdictions, how-
ever, have construed such benefit as a gift in lieu of the trustee's compen-
sation.14
The compensatory agreement in a trust instrument need not always
7 Compher v. Browning, 219 111. 429, 76 N.E. 678 (1906).
8 Kaiser v. Second National Bank, 123 Conn. 248, 193 Ad. 761 (1937); Bankcrs' Trust
Co. v. Forsyth, 266 Mich. 517, 254 N.W. 190 (1934).
9 262 11. App. 440, 443 (1931).
I0 City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 287 N.Y.S. 784 (1936).
11 112 N.Y.S. 2d 203 (1952).
12 Matter of Mason, 98 N.Y. 527 (1885).
13 National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Reinhardt, 34 Wash. 2d 319, 208 P. 2d
857 (1949).
14 Matter of Lewis, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 791 (1952); Matter of Cohen, 128 Misc. 906, 220
N.Y.S. 509 (1927).
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have its origin between the trustee and settlor. Hence, contracts between
the trustee and the beneficiary fixing the amount of the compensation for
trustees' services are permissible when entered into honestly and in good
faith. 15 If the amount fixed by the parties is less than that to which the
trustee would have otherwise been entitled, considering the size of the
estate, he is entitled to no more than that expressly provided for, 6 and if
the amount agreed upon is more than that which he would have otherwise
received, he then also is entitled to only the amount stipulated in the
agreement.17
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Where no agreement is provided for as to what the compensation of the
trustee shall be, statutory enactments are often applied in an attempt to
realize some standardization in settling trustees' fees.' Ordinarily, the
statute provides for compensation at a certain percentage of the amount
of income received and paid out by the trustee. This percentage is usually
based on a sliding scale whereby a larger estate commands a smaller per
cent and vice versa. 19 In some states, although there are no statutes fixing
fees for trustees, there are often provisions for compensation to executors
and administrators. The courts in those jurisdictions have held that trustees
are entitled to the same remuneration as the executor or administrator
receives. 20
Still other jurisdictions have enacted provisions which do not establish
a particular amount or percentage for compensation, but only provide
generally that the trustee is entitled to a reasonable compensation. 21 More
particularly, In Illinois, the related statute stipulates:
That where a trustee or trustees shall hereafter act under any power or ap-
pointment given or created by any will, testament or codicil, and in such will,
testament or codicil, except in case of trusts for charitable, religious or educa-
tional purposes, shall be contained no provision respecting the compensation
to be allowed or paid such trustee or trustees, a reasonable compensation may
be charged and allowed, demanded and collected therefor .... 22
In such statutes, where the particular amount of compensation is not
set forth, the court will take various factors into consideration to deter-
'5 In re Munsey's Estate, 163 Misc. 904, 298 N.Y.S. 140 (1937); Marshall v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 209 Mo. App. 13, 236 S.W. 692 (1922).
'1In re Stenson's Estate, 143 Pa. 512, 18 A. 2d 678 (1941).
17 In re Buder, 358 Mo. 796, 217 S.W. 2d 563 (1949).
18 Consult Scott, Trusts, S 242, at 1,927 n. 4 (1956) for a listing of statutory provisions.
9 In re Peabody's Estate, 218 Wis. 541, 260 N.W. 444 (1935).
20 3 Scott, Trusts, p. 1928, S 242.
21 Ibid. 22 111. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 148, S 31.
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mine the reasonableness of the fee; viz., the difficulty of the service ren-
dered, the risks engendered by the administration of the trust, and the
responsibilities imposed upon the trustee.23
In conjunction with statutory provisions, banks and trust associations in
some of the larger cities have compiled standard charges for administering
trusts.2 4 These charges are frequently computed on a graduated scale.2 1
DISCRETION OF A COURT
In the absence of an agreement in the trust instrument or of any statu-
tory provision definitely establishing the compensation of a trustee, the
entire matter of such compensation is within the sound discretion of the
courts. 26 Although the element of reasonableness is the underlying crite-
rion in the courts' consideration of this problem, there are various coin-
ponents upon which different jurisdictions premise their conclusions in
arriving at an equitable fee for the trustee.
One of the determining considerations employed by the courts is the
success or failure of the trustee in caring for the trust. The court deciding
In re Vastine's Estate27 found that where in all substantial matters the
management of the estate had been conducted skillfully and carefully,
producing an excess of annual income over the usual earnings, the trustee
should receive a greater allowance in return. In Humphrey v. McLain2
the court declared that where the administration of a trust had resulted in
an increase in value of the estate, this was to be considered in setting the
fee for the trustee. Conversely, where in the services performed, the state
sustained a loss, the Court asserted:
Losses in the business were perhaps inevitable during the period of the great
depression, and it should be added that there was no evidence of willful violation
... of his duty as trustee, but the fact remains that under his sole management
the entire capital investment was wiped out. In determining whether the com-
pensation which he claimed was excessive, we must consider the nature and re-
sults of his labor, the benefits, if any, which accrued to his beneficiary and all
of the pertinent circumstances. 29
23 Rogers v. Belt, 317 11. App. 81, 45 N.E. 2d 511 (1942).
24 4 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 974, at 365 n. 22 (1948).
25 Ibid. Several of the larger Chicago banks have set forth the following:
Charge on Charge on
Income Stocks and Bondi Mortgages
Per Cent Per Cent
First $2,500 -------- ........... 6 9
Next $97,500. 3 9
N ext $100,000 ---------------------- 2 Y 9
N ext $100,000 ....-................. 2 V 9
Next $100,000 - -- 2/4 9
Over $400,000 .-.............. 2 9
26 In the Estate of Hanna, 383 Pa. 196, 117 A. 2d 730 (1955).
27 190 Pa. 443, 42 Atl. 1038 (1899). 28 219 Ky. 180, 292 S.W. 794 (1927).
29 In re Patton's Estate, 170 Ore. 186, 193, 132 P. 2d 402,407 (1942).
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Some jurisdictions look to the characteristics of the trustee regardless
of the success or failure of the estate's administration. In Weiderhold v.
Mathis30 it was maintained that the negligence and irregularity of the
trustee in discharging the trust were properly considered notwithstanding
that the estate suffered no loss or diminution on that account. The charac-
ter and powers of a trustee, the relation of such position to all the duties
imposed, and the accompanying responsibilities are often recognized as
the premise from which obligations to the trust arise and upon which the
right to compensation is based. 31 In Follansbee v. Outhet,22 where the
trustee was an attorney, his ability, intelligence, and skill in the exercise of
his duties were determining.
Some courts give approbation to an amount for compensation based on
the time and work that the trustee expends in caring for the trust. In
Dznne v. Cooke' 3 the court declared that the amount or value of the
estate would not be used to determine fees where the trustee took no
active part in the business or in shaping its policy, nor in the management
of the estate. On the other hand, where the trustee's duties were made
more onerous due to inimical relationships between the parties, it was
asserted:
From the record it clearly appears that certain of the beneficiaries of the trust
estate are hostile to each other, are extremely litigious and faultfinding, and
instead of cooperating with the trustees are antagonistic to them ... their atti-
tude and conduct toward the present trustees have greatly increased the latters'
work and have made more difficult the handling of an estate already compli-
cated by many problems. For such increased work the trustees are entitled to be
reasonably compensated. 4
The nature and character of the trustee's duties are also considered
whereby tasks involving judgment and discretion command a higher
award than those which are merely ministerial.3 5 In Re Estate of Dor-
r'ance36 held that what the customary compensation was for "like work in
a like area" would be a criterion in fixing an amount of compensation.
Another yardstick used in arriving at an equitable conclusion on the
question of compensation is the relation of the fee to the value and income
of the estate. In advocating such basis, the court asserted in Phoenix v.
Livingston:
30 204 111. App. 3 (1917).
31 Dunne v. Cooke, 197 I11. App. 422 (1916).
32 182 I11. App. 213 (1913).
33 Authority cited note 31 supra.
34 In re Quinn's Estate, 64 R.I. 322, 324, 12 A. 2d 275, 276 (1940).
'5 Purdy v. Johnson, 18 Cal. 310, 248 Pac. 764 (1926); In re Taylor's Estate, 281 Pa. 440,
126 Ad. 809 (1924).
36 186 Pa. St. 64, 40 Ad. 149 (1898).
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"I"he office of a trustee was at first deemed honorary and without coniijensa-
tion, but our statute changed the rule, and allowed compensation to executors,
administrators, and guardians at a fixed percentage, to be computed upon all
sums received and paid out .... To that we must therefore refer, and by that be
governed in determining what allowance, if any, is to be made. Sums received
and paid out are made the basis of computation.37
Perhaps the last important consideration employed by courts in estab-
lishing trustee's compensation is the responsibility incurred by the trustee.
In In re Harrison's Estate"8 it was decided that to fix compensation on a
percentage basis was not adequate because a very small percentage which
would seem reasonable might result in a large sum in gross suggesting a
fee beyond what was adequate and fair to the trustee. On the other hand,
a large percentage which apparently would be an excessive compensation
might result in a small sum in gross which would disclose an unfair
amount. Thus, the court concluded, the only safe rule to adopt and fol-
low is to pay a trustee for the services performed and the liability in-
curred. In another case it was declared:
In states where there is no fixed statutory rate of compensation for trustees,
it is usual to allow commissions for the ordinary service of trustees... and where
exceptional circumstances show that the compensation reckoned in this way
is too large or too small, the rate will be varied or another method of reckon-
ing may be employed. The elements which determine proper compensation are
the amount of risk and responsibility and the time and labor required of the
trustee .....
CONCLUSION
The compensation of a trustee is not determined by any established
practice of law, and unless provided for by agreement or statute, remuner-
ation is peculiarly within the discretion of the courts. The compensation
allowed, in light of the aforementioned criteria, is for the trier of the facts
to decide, and his action will not be set aside unless arbitrary or capricious
or, unless, unsupported by substantial evidence.4 0 Since the judgment of
the courts in such cases cannot be disturbed, parties contemplating a par-
ticular fee for the trustee's service should provide for a particular amount
in the trust agreement.
37 101 N.Y. 451, 456, 5 N.E. 70, 71 (1886).
38 217 Pa. 207, 66 Ad. 354 (1907).
39 Authority cited note 19 supra at 546, 447.
40 Authority cited note 26 supra.
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND COMMON LAW TRADE-
MARKS: STATE OR FEDERAL JURISDICTION?
Prior to the passage of the Trade-Mark Act of 1946,1 protection
afforded a person's unregistered brands was limited to an action for un-
1 I5 U.S.C., Sj 1051-1127 (1948), referred to also as the Lanham Act.
